Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand & Harry Binswanger

Author:Ayn Rand & Harry Binswanger [Rand, Ayn & Binswanger, Harry]
Language: eng
Format: epub, azw3, mobi
Tags: General, Philosophy, Modern, History & Surveys, Epistemology, Objectivism (Philosophy), Knowledge; Theory Of, Theory of, Knowledge
ISBN: 9780452010307
Google: VttF6CuC-cQC
Amazon: 0452010306
Publisher: Plume
Published: 1967-01-02T00:00:00+00:00

Implicit Concepts

Prof. G: The question I have deals with the concept “implicit.” I want first to get at the general notion of “implicit” and then its meaning in the notions of “implicit concept,” “implicit measurement,” etc.

AR: Well, I would like to state my general definition, and then let’s examine it.

The “implicit” is that which is available to your consciousness but which you have not conceptualized. For instance, if you state a certain proposition, implicit in it are certain conclusions, but you may not necessarily be aware of them, because a special, separate act of consciousness is required to draw these consequences and grasp conceptually what is implied in your original statement. The implicit is that which is available to you but which you have not conceptualized.

Prof. G: This is one of the points I want to get at. In both Chapter 1 and other parts of your book, you use the concept “implicit” to talk about “implicit concepts,” “implicit knowledge,” and “implicit measurement-omission.” Now, I thought I could observe that there were several senses of “implicit,” both as it is actually used in ordinary discussions and in your own discussions. What I would like to understand is in what sense or senses you were using the term in each of the above cases.

AR: Remember, we are not linguistic analysts here.

Prof. G: I don’t think there is any assumption of that. I am not a linguistic analyst.

AR: Okay.

Prof. G: Take the notion of “implicit measurement-omission.” There seem to be two senses of “implicit” here. One sense could be that there is some form of awareness or recognition, but not an explicit formulation, of the process of measurement-omission. I know you don’t hold that. But, for example, you could say that when concepts are formed, there is a certain form of awareness or recognition that something like measurement-omission is involved, but one can’t explicitly state the fact that the concepts are formed through measurement-omission.

The other sense of “implicit” would be not that there is some form of awareness or recognition—that might not be present at all—but the sense of “implicit” in which something is presupposed by, or is a condition for, something else. I think this might be present in axiomatic concepts, for example. When you say that axiomatic concepts are implicit in all knowledge, the sense of “implicit” there might also include the notion that axiomatic concepts have a relationship to other concepts in a hierarchy—there is a logical connection between axiomatic concepts and other concepts. And I think that the nature of the relationship here would be that axiomatic concepts are presupposed in higher concepts.

AR: I would have to ask you what you mean by “presuppose.” Normally, “presuppose” means that you cannot hold concept A unless you have first grasped concept B. There is an almost chronological projection here—if you do not grasp B, you cannot grasp A. That is what “presuppose” means. That isn’t the same thing as “implicit.”

Prof. G: Then I was just wrong on that.

AR: You are

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